A birthday attack on a cryptographic hash function exploits the birthday paradox to find a collision (two distinct messages m1 and m2 such that H(m1)=H(m2)) in O(2n/2) operations.
Sender S: Before signing, sender S can generate many valid variations of an innocent message m and many variations of a fraudulent message m′ until finding a collision pair with H(m)=H(m′). S can then digitally sign m using their private key and later substitute m′ with the same signature. Thus, statement (I) is possible.
Third-party attacker and Receiver R: Neither a third-party attacker nor the receiver R has sender S's private key. Furthermore, for an existing message m that has already been signed by S, finding another message m′ such that H(m′)=H(m) requires a preimage/second-preimage attack (complexity O(2n)), not a birthday attack. Thus, statements (II) and (III) are not possible via a birthday attack.
Therefore, only (I) is a possible security violation, which corresponds to option B.